Recent experimental research on ultimatum and dictator games has found that first movers in such games tend to offer more to their counterparts than noncooperative game theory would predict. In fact, the modal offer is generally half the pie to be divided, while noncooperative game theory would suggest an offer of the smallest monetary unit. It is often argued that these results suggest a taste for fairness on the part of students participating in these experiments. In this paper we report the results of ultimatum and dictator games experiments designed to explore the underlying reasons for this apparent taste for "fairness." We find that if the right to be the first mover is earned by scoring high on a general knowledge quiz, and that right is reinforced by the instructions as being earned, then first movers behave in a significantly more self-regarding manner. Because our instructional procedures for earning rights can be interpreted as a "demand" treatment, but also to remove ail social influences on choice, we conducted "double blind" dictator experiments, in which individual subject decisions cannot be known by the experimenter or by anyone except the decision maker. The results yielded by far our largest observed number of selfregarding offers --significantly more than obtained in any of our other treatments: or any previously reported in the literature. Our interpretation is that offers in ultimatum and dictator games appear to be determined predominantly by strategic and expectations considerations. Other-regarding behavior is primarily an expectations phenomenon, rather than the result of an autonomous private preference for equity.
In the ultimatum game the proposer must form expectations on the reservation value of the counterpart, i.e., the amount X which the counterpart will reject. Thus, concerns for 'fairness' are confounded by the proposer's strategic expectations over reservation values.
Since, in the dictator game, the proposer's split is final, expectations about reservation values on X are not assumed to enter into the proposer's decision. Theory predicts that a self interested, nonsatiated dictator will split M/zero. FHSS [1988] find that proposers in the dictator game take significantly more of M (where M is either 55 or S10) than proposers in the ultimatum game. However, a substantial number do not split M/zero. They conclude 'that the distribution of proposals in the ultimatum game cannot be fully explained by a taste for fairness among proposers.' (p. 23) But how do we explain the ultimatum data?
The dictator data?
A reasonable rational model of the data in both games can be stated in terms of subjects' expectations. In such simple experiments, particularly the dictator game, subjects may ask themselves (unconsciously): What is the experimenter's objective? (1) They may think that their actions in this game will affect the experimenter's decision to have them participate in future experiments. (2) They think they will be chosen to participate in future experiments: but they may be concerned that their current decisions will affect which later experiments they are selected for. (3) They may be concerned about appearing greedy and being judged so by the experimenter. Under this latter interpretation 'fairness' is not 'own' preference, but a derivative of judgement by others. Note that none of these 'explanations' requires a personal fairness ethic or focal considerations. In the ultimatum game the proposer must form expectations about his or her counterpart's reservation value. Thus, a risk averse proposer may give his or her counterpart more than is predicted by noncooperative theory in order to insure acceptance of the proposal. Rational behavior is to choose X* = arg max u(M-X)F(X); where F is the first mover's subjective probability that offer X will be accepted, and captures the expectations of the proposer. But even a subject dictator may still be influenced by expectations about the experimenter's judgmatic response, or future (subject recruiting) behavior, and thus may still give the counterpart a positive amount of money.
Experimenter knowledge of subject expectations is null, and control over them is limited to instructions and pregame treatments. Moreover, certain controls may be inadvertent. For example in past experiments subjects were randomly assigned a type.
Usually, randomization would be justified: e.g. when we can t control for a variable we randomize across treatment. But in the ultimatum experiments randomization may not be neutral, since it can be interpreted by subjects as an attempt by the experimenter to treat them fairly. Lotteries are often used for the fair' award of rights such as hunting permits and basketball seats. Thus experimenters may unwittingly induce 'fairness.' A subject may feel that, since the experimenter is being fair to them, they should be fair to each other.
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS
A property right is a guarantee to dispose of property within guidelines defined by the right. The guarantee is against reprisal, in that a property right places restrictions on punishment strategies which might otherwise be used to insure cooperative behavior. Such 5 rights are taken for granted in private ownership economies, but is this so for the subjects in bargaining experiments?
In bargaining experiments subjects may be less influenced by the experimenters' implicit objectives, or by the possibility of punishment strategies by a counterpart, if they have earned the right to make use of an advantaged position and the right is common knowledge. Hoffman and Spitzer [1982, 1985] (hereafter HS) present experimental data which supports this view. 
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The above procedures are also applied to the dictator game, except that the buyer has no decision to make. In the exchange context, this means that the buyer has a prior commitment to make the purchase whatever the price chosen by the seller. Table 1 Table 2 ). Specifically, two-thirds of the first movers now offer zero and 84% offer zero or one: only two of thirty-six subjects offer a fair' equal split of $5; and one enigmatic subject offers $9.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Here is a brief summary and interpretation of our primary findings. . If the buyer chooses NOT BUY, each of you will be paid nothing, whatever might have been the seller's choice of PRICE. The seller will be given a choice form. After he/she has circled a PRICE choice, the experimenter will circle this PRICE on the buyer's choice form, and the buyer will choose BUY or NOT BUY.
Instructions
You have been asked to participate in an economics experiment. For your participation today we have paid you $5 in cash. You may earn an additional amount of money, which will also be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
In this experiment each of you will be paired with a different person who is in another room.
You will not be told who these people are either during or after the experiment. This is room A.
You will notice that there are other people in the same room with you who are also participating in the experiment.
You will not be paired with any of these people.
One of the persons in room A will be chosen to be the monitor for today's experiment. The monitor will be paid $10 in addition to the $5 already paid.
The monitor will be in charge of the envelopes as explained below.
In addition the monitor will verify that the instructions have been followed as they appear here.
The experiment is conducted as follows: Fourteen unmarked envelopes have been placed in a box.
Twelve of these envelopes contain 10 one dollar bills and 10 blank slips of paper. The remaining 2 envelopes contain 2 0 blank slips of paper. The monitor will be given a list of names of people in the room.
He or she will call one person at a time to the back of the room, and hand each person an envelope from the box.
The person who was called will then go to one of the seats, with a large box on top, in the back of the room.
The envelope will then be opened privately inside the box.
Only the person who was given the envelope will know what the envelope contains.
Each person in room A must decide how many dollar bills (if any) and how many slips of paper to put in the envelope. The number of dollar bills plus the number of slips of paper must add up to 10.
The person then pockets the remaining dollar bills and slips of paper. Examples: (1) Put $2 and 8 slips in the envelope, pocket $8 and 2 slips. (2) Put $9 and 1 slip in the envelope, pocket $1 and 9 slips. These are examples only, the actual decision is up to each person.
If the envelope has 20 blank slips, put 10 blank slips in the envelope and pocket the other 10. This is done in private and we ask that you tell no one of your decision. Notice that each envelope returned will look exactly the same. Also note that no one else, including the experimenter will know the personal decisions of people in room A.
Once you have made your decision you will seal your envelope and place it in the box marked return envelopes.
You may then leave the room.
After all fourteen envelopes have been returned the monitor will take the box to room B.
There are 14 people in room B. Each of these persons has been paid $5 to participate. The monitor will be given a list of names of people in room B.
The monitor will then call up the people in room B.
The monitor will choose an envelope from the box, open the envelope, record its contents, and give the contents of the envelope to the person called up. They are then free to leave.
The monitor will continue until all the envelopes have been handed out and everyone else has left the room. The experiment is then over.
